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Abstract 
 
We conduct an incentivized experiment to test whether the willingness to pay is 
higher for debit cards compared to cash for three consumer products. Our 
findings support this conjecture also after controlling for cash availability, 
spending type, price familiarity and consumption habits of the products. The 
evidence thus suggests that different representations of money matters for 
consumer behavior. 
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1. Introduction  
Conventional economics assumes that consumer valuations of products and services are 
independent of how money is represented, yet there is growing evidence that suggests that 
the payment method affects spending behavior (e.g. Hirschman, 1979, Feinberg, 1986, 
Prelec and Simester, 2001, Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008, 2009, Soman, 2001, 2003, 
Vandoros, 2012). One strand of this research focuses on the differences between cash and 
gift certificates (“scrip money”), between cash and pre-paid cards, or between different 
denominations of cash (Felsö and Soetevent, 2014, Mishra et al. 2006, Raghubir and 
Srivastava, 2008, 2009, Soman, 2003, Vandoros, 2012). These studies find differences in 
spending behavior between the payment method and cash as well as within the domain of 
cash. They suggest that the format of money matters but apart from cash denominations, 
many of these payment methods are restricted to certain purchases (e.g. pre-paid cards are 
often used for smaller purchases, transportation, such as the Oyster card in the UK, or 
prepaid phone cards) or to certain stores/locations. Thus, they may not be treated as 
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substitutes for cash (see Felsö and Soetevent, 2014) and their impact on aggregate consumer 
spending is limited. 
The majority of the literature however studies credit cards and spending behavior (e.g. 
Hirschman, 1979, Feinberg, 1986, Prelec and Simester, 2001, Raghubir and Srivastava, 
2008, Soman, 2003) but few investigate debit cards even though these have become 
increasingly popular. For example, debit cards are by far the most popular payment card in 
the Scandinavian countries (Sveriges Riksbank, 2013) and in the US the share of debit card 
transactions surpassed the share of credit card transactions in 2004 (CPSS, 2005). In 
addition, debit cards do not wrestle with the fact that consumption and payment are 
temporally separated nor that transactions are lumped together into a single bill upon 
payment, both which may induce differences in spending (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998, 
Hafalir, and Loewenstein, 2009). Debit card payments are both ubiquitous and immediate.  
In this note, we investigate whether consumers pay more for identical products using 
debit cards compared to cash. We conduct an incentivized experiment in Denmark where 
debit cards, typically the local debit card Dankort, is the most common payment method in 
terms of transaction value and 82 percent of the population between 15-79 years old owns a 
Dankort (Nationalbanken, 2011). Our experiment further controls for the possibility that 
participants may not carry enough cash on them at the time of the purchase and would have 
to incur the cost of going to the ATM if they wanted to spend more, one reason why 
spending might be lower with cash. 
 
 
2. Debit Cards and Spending 
The evidence on whether debit cards incur higher spending than cash (or other payment 
methods) is sparse. In a field experiment, Soetevent (2011) finds that conditional on 
choosing to donate money, debit cards lead to higher donations compared to cash. Since 
only 9 percent of the approached households choose to donate money in the debit treatment, 
compared to 67 percent in the cash treatment, this difference may however be caused by 
household characteristics of those who choose to donate. A propensity score matching 
estimator suggests that households with similar characteristics tend to donate more using 
debit card than cash. Soman (2003) argues that the transparency of a payment method (the 
salience of parting with money) affects spending and consumption behavior (see also Prelec 
and Loewenstein, 1998) and finds that payment methods that differ in transparency lead to 
differences in consumption. Soman does not test debit cards but ranks them as low in 
transparency compared to cash which is ranked as the most transparent payment method. 
Thus, the lower salience of debit cards compared to cash suggests that paying with debit 
card should lead to higher spending. 
Since debit and credit cards are similar in terms of the salience of the form and the 
amount paid (Soman, 2003) and debit cards often come decorated with the same logos from 
payment service providers such as Visa and Mastercard, some of the related studies on credit 
cards should be mentioned. Feinberg (1986) uses a lab experiment showing that simply 
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exposing students to the MasterCard logo and replicas of actual MasterCards increase cash 
donations to a charity. Simester and Prelec (2001) conduct two incentivized experiments 
comparing credit cards to cash by selling sports tickets, which are of uncertain value, and a 
dinner certificate with a stated value. They find that those who are instructed to pay using 
credit cards and exposed to their credit card have a higher willingness to pay for the sports 
tickets than cash payers who are not exposed to their credit cards. For the dinner certificate, 
this finding is not replicated but they find a difference among credit card and cash payers 
who are both exposed to their credit cards and that those cash payers who are exposed to 
their credit card do not have a higher willingness to pay compared to those cash payers who 
are not exposed to their credit card. Their results suggest that the payment method itself 
matters, not only the logo effect. How uncertainty of the value of the product interacts with 
the results is unclear since their two experiments differ in more aspects than the type of 
product. In any case, it suggests that it is important to control for consumers’ beliefs of how 
much a product costs.  
 
 
3. Does Willingness to Pay Differ Due to Payment Method? 
To test whether the willingness to pay for identical products differs between debit cards and 
cash, we sell three consumer products varying the payment method. To ensure that 
participants reveal their reservation prices, we use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism (see also Prelec and Simester, 2001). We further control for cash availability, 
order effects, spending type, price familiarity and consumption of the products, and we 
make immediate transactions using new payment technology. 
3.1 Experimental Design 
We elicit willingness to pay using the incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism. With this mechanism, participants make bids for each of the three products. For 
each product, a participant’s bid is randomly selected and a sale price is randomly drawn. If 
the selected participant’s bid is higher or equal to the sale price, she buys the product for the 
sale price. If her bid is lower than the sale price, there is no purchase and a new participant’s 
bid and sale price is drawn until all products are sold. To control for that participants may 
not be carrying enough cash at the time of the experiment, we pay them 100 DKK 
(≈US$17.5) which they can use in the experiment. Bids are therefore restricted to a 
maximum of 100 for each product.
1
  
The selected products are a clip card for ten beers at a student pub (cost 170), a clip 
card for six coffees from the full selection of coffees at a student café (cost 100), and a clip 
card for ten black coffees at the same café (cost 40). Both the student pub and the café are 
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located in the participant pool’s university building. To control for order effects (see e.g. 
Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), the order in which the products are presented to the 
participants vary in four ways always keeping the coffee items together. 
Our three treatments differ along two dimensions. First, we vary the payment method. 
In the cash treatment, the successful participants pay for the products using cash while in the 
card/cash treatment, they pay using debit card. Thus, if participants are willing to pay more 
for a product using debit card compared to cash, we should observe that bids are higher in 
the card/cash treatment. Second, we vary how we pay the 100. In the card/account 
treatment, instead of paying the money in cash as in the card/cash treatment, we transfer 
them using PayPal. 
The inclusion of the card/account treatment is for exploratory purposes since the 
expected outcome is ambiguous. The main reason for including it is to find out whether 
simply showing cash depresses bids for card payers. For example, the logo effect (Feinberg, 
1986) suggests that if cash is associated with lower valuations then seeing the 100 available 
to spend in cash may decrease bids. In this case, bids should be higher in card/account than 
in card/cash. On the other hand, if spending is lower in card/account than in card/cash it 
might be due to an earmarking effect. Studies show that, for example, contributions to taxes 
increase when these taxes are earmarked for specific purposes (e.g. Hundsdoerfer et al. 
2013, Sclen and Kallbekken, 2011) and that child benefits are related to higher spending on 
child related products (e.g. Kooreman, 2000, Del Boca and Flinn, 1994). In the cash and 
card/cash treatment, all the participants see the money available to spend in the experiment. 
In the card/account treatment the money never materializes but goes directly into 
participants’ accounts which therefore may reduce the feeling of the money being earmarked 
for the experiment. Since cash availability is a real concern in the Danish case, we did not 
include a cash/account treatment. 
3.2 Procedure 
82 master level students (37 female, 45 male, average age 27) at the IT University in 
Copenhagen participated. The experiment lasted 30-40 minutes and was conducted during 
lecture time on April 4, 5 and 8, 2013. The students had received an email in advance with 
some general information about the experiment including that everyone would receive 100 
DKK for their participation. No course credits were given.
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In all treatments, we first handed out receipt forms for the participation remuneration 
and gave the general instructions, orally and written, together with specific instructions for 
each treatment. In the cash treatment we informed the students that we would pay for their 
participation upfront in cash and we asked them to keep the 100 DKK banknote that they 
received on the desk in front of them. In the card/cash treatment we instead asked them to 
put the banknote in their pocket and to put their debit card on the desk in front of them as 
they would need it during the experiment. This was done to ensure that everyone had a debit 
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card and that they would be exposed to the payment method. We also checked that all cards 
were indeed debit cards when we handed out the money.
3
,
4
  
The card/account treatment proceeded as the card/cash treatment but instead of 
paying the students in cash we informed them that we would transfer 100 DKK via Paypal 
using the email address that they wrote on the receipt. We further informed them that our 
assistant, who was sitting at a desk next to the experimenter, would make the transfers 
directly during the session. We did this to ensure that the students felt they had the money 
available to spend. 
We then proceeded with the instructions for the auction. To ensure that everyone 
understood the BDM mechanism, students answered control questions regarding the 
procedure which we announced the right answers to before they wrote down their bids. After 
collecting the bid forms we made the draws to sell the products in front of the class. Those 
students whose bids were successful paid the experimenter directly using cash in the cash 
treatment and using card via iZettle
5
 in the card treatments. A student who had already had a 
successful bid would not partake in subsequent draws.  
After completing the sale, we elicited how much the subjects thought each clip card 
cost since this may affect their bids. This part was incentivized by paying one subject, 
randomly selected at the end of the experiment, 20 for each correct guess. The students also 
rated themselves on the spendthrift-tightwad scale (Rick et al. 2008), which captures 
whether they feel that they have difficulty controlling spending or if they tend to hold on to 
tight to their money. The experiment ended with background questions including 
consumption habits for beer and coffee and payment habits. 
 
 
4. Results 
It is worth noting that among the participants 23 percent carried no cash on them at the time 
of the experiment and 65 percent carried less than 100. This suggests that cash constraints 
could indeed have played a role in bids had we not controlled for this. The participants are 
highly familiar with using debit cards: the median of participants’ share of transactions with 
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 We ran the cash and the card/cash treatment simultaneously on April 4 and 8. To do this, we first divided the class into 
two groups. The cash treatment stayed in the classroom and the card/cash treatment was directed to another classroom. The 
experimenters used a manuscript to ensure that all subjects received the same information in their respective treatments. For 
practical and administrative reasons, we did not divide the class for the card/account treatment. However, since all 
participating students belonged to the same study programs, but not the same course, we tested for possible session effects 
using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests in the cash and card/cash treatments but did not find any differences between the 
participants. 
4 Five students could not participate in the card treatments as they did not have a debit card on them. 
5 iZettle is a payment dongle that is plugged into any iPhone or Android based mobile phone. It converts the mobile into 
payment card terminal. 
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debit cards is 90 percent, for cash it is only 5 percent. Thus, if we do find a difference it is 
unlikely that it depends on inexperience with card payments. 
Figure 1 shows the average of participants’ bids for each of the three products and the 
average of the sum of the bids for each participant. The figure clearly shows that average 
bids are higher in the card/cash group than the cash group. Univariate statistical tests show 
that coffee (black coffee only) and the total are significantly higher in the card/cash group 
than in the cash group and weakly significantly higher for beer (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
tests (WMW), two-sided, n=53, beer: p=0.086, expensive coffee: p=0.173; coffee: p=0.023, 
total: p=0.035). These findings indicate that payment form does matter for consumer 
valuations of products. Figure 1 further shows that bids for coffee are significantly lower in 
card/account than in card/cash  and weakly significantly lower for beer and total which 
points to an earmarking effect (WMW, two-sided, n=54, beer: p=0.083, expensive coffee: 
p=0.378; coffee: p=0.019, total: p=0.056). There are no significant differences between cash 
and card/account (WMW, two-sided, n=57, beer: p=0.994, expensive coffee: p=0.446; 
coffee: p=0.923, total: p=0.762). 
 
Figure 1: Average bids in the Cash, Card/Cash and Card/Account group 
 
 
To control for additional factors that may affect bids, we use Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions since this method produces more efficient estimates than single regressions 
when we have product specific variables and the regression errors are correlated for a given 
individual but not across individuals. Table 1 shows that the results remain but are stronger: 
bids are significantly higher in the card/cash group than in the cash group and significantly 
lower in the card/account group than in the card/cash group for beer and coffee. Contrary to 
our expectations, there is also a small and negative effect of spending personality on beer 
bids, captured by the variable “Type”. It suggests that a participant who perceives she has 
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difficulty controlling spending bids slightly lower for beer. There is also a small but 
positively significant effect of participants’ beliefs about the cost of the items captured by 
the variable “Value”. A participant who believes that coffee costs more also bids slightly 
more for coffee. 
Table 1: Regression Results 
 
  Beer  Expensive Coffee Coffee 
Cash -17.439** -1.281 -13.988** 
  (7.900) (6.205) (6.994) 
Card/Account -15.917** -1.625 -13.925** 
  (8.049) (5.612) (6.873) 
    
Type -1.884** 0.125 -0.960 
  (0.865) (0.657) (0.746) 
Value -0.081 0.164** 0.102*** 
  (0.074) (0.688) (0.040) 
Consumption 0.111 0.541 0.644 
  (0.647) (1.231) (1.580) 
    
Constant 82.252*** 11.749 31.820** 
  (21.673) (13.536) (13.172) 
        
Order YES YES YES 
        
No of obs.  82 82 82 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 
 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The way money is represented clearly influences consumers’ willingness to pay for identical 
products. While this effect has been studied before using credit cards, it is easy to argue that 
the temporal separation of payment and consumption may be driving the results. Thus, we 
control for this by comparing debit cards to cash. Another reason for why valuations may be 
lower when paying with cash is simply that participants may not be carrying enough cash 
and are reluctant to incur the cost of going to the ATM if they wish to spend more. Our 
experimental set-up controls for this as well as several other factors that might explain why 
differences may occur. When we change the way we remunerate participants by transferring 
the money via PayPal, we find no differences between debit cards and cash. We suggest that 
this is due to an earmarking effect and thus a consequence of the experimental design. The 
reason for not including a cash/account treatment, which would be the natural comparison 
group to minimize differences due to earmarking, was that we wanted to control for cash 
availability and we did find that most of the participants had less than 100 DKK on their 
person at the time of the experiment. The reason for including the transfer treatment was that 
we wished to learn whether simply showing cash when paying with card would depress bids. 
It is possible that such an effect is present but that it is much smaller than the earmarking 
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effect. Thus, an avenue for future research is to investigate the effect of payment methods on 
spending in the presence of several alternatives. Considering the vast number of payment 
methods available today, consumers can choose between payment methods kept in their 
physical wallet and/or in their smart phones and this selection may affect their spending 
behavior. 
This note complements the existing evidence on credit cards, gift certificates and pre-
paid cards by using debit cards which are physically different from cash but just as cash are 
both ubiquitous and involve immediate transactions. The findings suggest that the format of 
money matters and that one rationale for why cash is still widely used despite the desire to 
reduce the costly use of cash (see e.g. Bergman et al. 2008) is that cash makes it easier to 
control spending and that this effect is not solely due to cash-on-hand constraints. 
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